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I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread adoption of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code1 in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in an "uncertain correlation ' 2
between state personal property security law and the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898.1 Although the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 frequently relied
upon existing state law to determine the validity of a secured credi-
tor's interest in the personal property of a bankrupt debtor, its provi-
sions were more compatible with pre-Code personal property security
law.4 As a result, courts often struggled to reconcile the meanings of
the two statutes.5
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19786 held out
the promise of greater correspondence between the concepts of bank-
* Professor, University of Florida College of Law. A.B., 1966, Princeton; J.D., 1969, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
1. Uniform Comm. Code §§ 1-101 to 11-108 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]. All references
are to the 1972 Official Text of the U.C.C. unless otherwise noted.
2. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1283 (1965).
3. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act].
4. See Professor Gilmore's exploration of the relationship between the delayed perfection
of transfers permitted by § 60a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act and the concept of notice filing
adopted by the drafters of article 9. 2 G. GIMoRE, supra note 2, at 1325-35.
5. See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
6. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101-
151326 (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333).
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ruptcy law and those of article 9. The Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States, established in 1970 to study the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,7 relied heavily on the work of practitioners
and scholars familiar with article 9.8 The statutory revision proposed
by the Commission in 1973 embodied many recommendations made
by these practitioners and scholars,9 and served as an important
foundation for the Bankruptcy Reform Act.10
Although the Bankruptcy Reform Act employs concepts drawn
from article 9,11 some incongruities between the two statutes remain.
For example, under the provisions of article 9, a secured party may,
in certain circumstances, delay perfection of a security interest with-
out sacrificing priority to other parties whose claims to the secured
collateral arise before the security interest is perfected. If perfection
is about to expire or lapse, article 9 requires the secured party to
continue the perfection of the security interest in order to retain pri-
ority over others who may claim an interest in the collateral. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 also makes delayed perfection of se-
curity interests in personal property effective against the trustee in
bankruptcy, but the Reform Act authorizes delayed perfection in
cases in which article 9 does not. In addition, the Reform Act does
not expressly sanction continuation of perfection after bankruptcy
proceedings have been instituted.
This article explores some of the uncertainties in the relationship
between the Bankruptcy Reform Act and article 9. It first describes
and evaluates the article 9 provisions dealing with delayed and con-
tinued perfection. Against this background, the article examines the
relationship of delayed and continued perfection, under both the Re-
form Act and article 9, to the bankruptcy trustee's avoiding powers.
Finally, some suggestions for legislative changes in the Reform Act
are offered.
II. DELAYED AND CONTINUED PERFECTION UNDER ARTICLE 9
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code establishes three
methods of perfecting security interests: by filing a financing state-
7. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
8. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON um BANKRUPTcY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at 1-301; pt. H, at 1-300 (1973).
9. Id. pt. H.
10. A detailed legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 appears in Klee,
Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKE. L.J. 275 (1980). The legisla-
tive documents are reproduced in A. RESNICK & E. WyPysK, BANKRuPTcY REFORM ACT OF 1978:
A LEGISLATIVE I-ISTORY (1979).
11. See, for example, the definitions of inventory in 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(1) (1982) and
U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
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ment," by taking possession of the collateral,13 and through auto-
matic perfection (without either filing or possession). 4 Of these, filing
is the most commonly employed means of perfection. It also presents
the greatest number of delayed and continued perfection issues.
A. Delayed Perfection
Many pre-article 9 statutes regulating security interests in per-
sonal property required the creditor to file the actual security agree-
ment between the parties, or a copy thereof, in order to protect his
interest from others who might claim the debtor's property. 5 Be-
cause these "transaction filing" statutes mandated filing the agree-
ment creating the security interest, the creditor could not protect his
interest until the security transaction had been completed. Conse-
quently, the statutes often contained a grace period, running from
the time at which the parties entered into the agreement, during
which the creditor could file and obtain protection against third par-
ties whose claims to the collateral arose while the security agreement
was "off record.' 6
In contrast to pre-Code transaction filing statutes, article 9
utilizes a "notice filing" system.' 7 It permits filing a simple notice of a
security interest, the financing statement, 8 and does not require that
the security agreement 9 be placed on the public record. 20 Thus, the
parties to a secured transaction may complete a financing statement
and file it "before a security agreement is made or a security interest
otherwise attaches."'" For this reason, article 9, unlike transaction
12. U.C.C. § 9-302(1). The mechanics of filing are governed by U.C.C. §§ 9-401 to -408.
13. Id. § 9-305.
14. E.g., id. § 9-302(1)(d).
15. E.g., UNIF. COND. SALES ACT §§ 5, 10, 2 U.L.A. (act superseded by U.C.C.). For an
expansive discussion of the filing systems employed by pre-article 9 statutes regulating personal
property security interests, see 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 463-98, 579-631.
16. E.g., UNIF. COND. SALES AcT § 5, U.L.A. (act superseded by U.C.C.) (contract must be
"filed within ten days after the making of the conditional sale").
17. U.C.C. § 9-402, comment 2. The notice filing system of article 9 is derived from the
filing system of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 13, 9C U.L.A. 220
(1957) (act superseded by U.C.C.).
18. U.C.C. § 9-402(1). An example of a financing statement is set out in U.C.C. § 9-402(3).
19. Id. §§ 9-105(1)(1), -203()(a).
20. A copy of the security agreement may be filed, however, if it contains the information
required for a financing statement. Id. § 9-402(1).
21. Id. Article 9 also expressly provides that a financing statement filed before the parties
to a security transaction enter into a security agreement will perfect the security interest when
the agreement is completed and the security interest otherwise attaches. Id. § 9-303(1). A se-
curity agreement "attaches" when the parties have entered into an enforceable security agree-
ment, value has been given by the secured party, and the debtor has rights in the secured
collateral. Id. § 9-203(1).
[Vol. XXXVI
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
filing statutes, does not generally provide for filing grace periods.2
Despite this lack of necessity for grace periods, however, article 9
does permit delayed filing to be effective against intervening third
party claims to collateral in some instances.
The most important delayed filing provision in article 9 is section
9-301(2) which states:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money
security interest before or within ten days after the debtor re-
ceives possession of the collateral, he takes priority over the
rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise
between the time the security interest attaches and the time
of filing.
The scope of the section is quite limited. Only a secured party who
has a purchase money security interest can take advantage of the ten
day grace period for filing.23 Section 9-107 defines a purchase money
security interest as a security interest:
(a) [T]aken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure
all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by making
advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the
debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value
is in fact so used.
Filing within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the col-
lateral gives the secured party priority only over an intervening
transferee in bulk or lien creditor.2 ' If another secured creditor per-
fects his security interest before the purchase money secured party
files, his claim may take priority over the purchase money security
interest.2 5
It is important to note that the secured party's protection against
transferees in bulk and lien creditors may last for more than ten days
in some cases. Section 9-301(2) requires that the purchase money se-
22. 1 G. GILMoRE, supra note 2, at 496-98.
23. The section allows a grace period only in cases in which perfection of the security
interest is accomplished by filing. See also U.C.C. § 9-305: "A security interest is perfected by
possession from the time possession is taken without relation back and continues only so long
as possession is retained."
24. A "lien creditor" means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property in-
volved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors
from the time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of
the petition or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.
Id. § 9-301(3).
25. Id. § 9-312(5)(a). But see infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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cured party file before or within ten days after the debtor takes pos-
session of the collateral. After filing, however, the secured party takes
priority over transferees in bulk and lien creditors whose claims to
the collateral arise between the time that the security interest at-
taches and the time of filing. A security interest can attach when the
debtor has rights in the secured collateral,26 even if the debtor has
not received possession of the collateral. In cases in which the
debtor has rights in the collateral before receiving possession of it,
the secured party will be protected against the intervening claims of
bulk transferees and lien creditors for more than ten days after at-
tachment, so long as he files within ten days after the debtor takes
possession.
Although section 9-301(2) is limited in scope, it is not clear that
the provision is warranted. The drafters of article 9 believed that ad-
vance filing of financing statements would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, in typical purchase money security transactions.28 The typical
situation where a buyer "walks in off the street" and enters into a
security transaction, however, involves the seller or perhaps a lender
retaining a purchase money security interest in consumer goods.
There is no need for a filing grace period in this situation because a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods is automatically
perfected without filing or possession.29 If more substantial collateral
is involved, the parties are likely to negotiate the details of their
financing arrangement and, during these discussions, complete and
file a financing statement."0 Thus, a filing grace period is unnecessary
because the secured party easily could file before extending credit or
26. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
27. If the debtor is buying goods that are to be the secured collateral, the debtor obtains a
special property in them when they are identified to the contract for sale, even though the
goods have not been delivered to the debtor. Id. § 2-501(1). See also J. Wnirm & R. SuMMERs,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 917 (2d ed. 1980).
28. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 498.
29. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
30. In occasional cases in which perfection of a security interest is governed by a statute
other than article 9, it may be necessary to complete a security transaction before the security
interest can be perfected. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 319.27(2) (Supp. 1982) (to be noted on a motor
vehicle certificate of title, the notice of a lien must show, among other things, the date of the
lien and the make, type, and vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle).
It also is possible that practical problems, other than that of being unable to negotiate a
security transaction in advance, may make early filing of a financing statement difficult for
secured parties. For example, it may not be possible to describe the secured collateral ade-
quately until negotiations are complete. See U.C.C. § 9-110, -402(1). Moreover, there may be
delays associated with the delivery of the financing statement to the filing officer, particularly
in jurisdictions that have established a central, statewide filing system. Id. § 9-401(1) (first
alternative subsection (1)). Neither of these difficulties is unique to purchase money security
interests, however, and the solution to both is clear: do not advance funds to the debtor until
the financing statement is completed and filed.
(Vol. XXXVI
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making a loan to the debtor. Nevertheless, the drafters concluded
that, in the event of a priority conflict with an intervening lien credi-
tor or a bulk transferee, all purchase money secured parties should
receive the benefit of a filing grace period. 1
A second delayed filing provision, section 9-312(4), establishes a
ten day grace period for purchase money security interests in collat-
eral other than inventory.32 As in section 9-301(2), the grace period is
available only to holders of purchase money security interests' s and
runs from the time that the debtor receives possession of the collat-
eral.3 Section 9-312(4) provides only that the security interest must
be "perfected," rather than "filed,"35 but the interest usually will be
perfected by filing.36 Unlike section 9-301(2), section 9-312(4) gives
the purchase money secured party priority only over other secured
parties who claim an interest in the same collateral. When the sec-
tions are read together, however, it is clear that one with a purchase
money security interest in collateral other than inventory can obtain
priority over the competing claims of lien creditors, transferees in
bulk, and other secured parties by filing within ten days after the
debtor receives possession of the collateral. While those with
purchase money security interests in inventory cannot take advan-
tage of the filing grace period of section 9-312(4) to defeat conflicting
security interests in the same collateral, they can take priority over
31. It may be worth noting that purchase money security interests received favorable pri-
ority treatment under some pre-article 9 statutes and cases dealing with personal property se-
curity interests. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 743-58; J. WHTr & R. SuMMERS, supra note 27,
at 1043.
32. Section 9-312(4) provides: "A purchase money security interest in collateral other
than inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its pro-
ceeds if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives pos-
session of the collateral or within ten days thereafter."
A third filing grace period appears in U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a). Under that provision, a secured
party who has a purchase money security interest in goods that become fixtures and files before
the goods become fixtures or within ten days thereafter, takes priority over the interest of an
encumbrancer or owner of the real estate whose interest arises before the goods become
fixtures.
33. Id. § 9-107.
34. A security interest may attach before the debtor receives possession of the collateral.
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
35. See U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (filing requirement for priority). See also infra note 37 and
accompanying text.
36. Perfection by possession is effective only from the time that the secured party takes
possession of the collateral and it does not relate back to an earlier time. Id. § 9-305. Security
interests that are automatically perfected when they attach, e.g., id. § 9-302(1)(d) (purchase
money security interests in consumer goods), fall within the scope of section 9-312(4). The
favorable priority treatment that the section gives to purchase money secured parties normally
is not important when these interests are involved, however. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at
798-800.
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lien creditors and transferees in bulk under section 9-301(2). s3
Criticism of the filing grace period of section 9-312(4) in the con-
text of a notice filing system is much the same as that of the grace
period established by section 9-301(2). 38 Delayed filing is unnecessary
when the purchase money security interest is automatically perfected
upon attachment.3 9 In addition, no filing grace period is needed by a
secured party who negotiates a financing arrangement with the
debtor, because the parties can complete and file a financing state-
ment before the secured party extends credit. The drafters of article
9 believed, however, that the business practice of filing a financing
statement after delivery of secured collateral (other than inventory)
to the debtor supported the inclusion of a filing grace period in sec-
tion 9-312(4).4°
B. Continued Perfection
Continued perfection issues arise in cases in which the perfection
of a security interest must be extended beyond the time when the
original act of perfection ceases to be effective. A secured party may
find it necessary to continue perfection of his security interest in a
number of situations: a filed financing statement may lapse;41 a pe-
riod of temporary perfection may expire;42 the debtor or the collat-
eral may move to another jurisdiction;43 the debtor may change its
37. U.C.C. § 9-301(2). The priority of a purchase money security interest in inventory
over conflicting security interests in the same collateral is governed by U.C.C. § 9-312(3), which
does not contain a filing grace period. The drafters of article 9 believed that the methods of
financing inventory were sufficiently different from those employed for other types of collateral
to warrant the imposition of different perfection and notification requirements in cases involv-
ing purchase money security interests in inventory. Id. § 9-312(3), comment 3.
38. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
39. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
40. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 799-800.
41. "[A] filed financing statement is effective for a period of five years from the date of
filing. The effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses on the expiration of the five year
period unless a continuation statement is filed prior to the lapse." U.C.C. § 9-403(2).
42. To the extent that a security interest in instruments or negotiable documents arises
for new value under a written security agreement, it is perfected automatically for a period of
21 days from the time it attaches. Id. § 9-304(4). A security interest in instruments, negotiable
documents, or goods in the possession of a bailee other than one who has issued a negotiable
document remains perfected for a period of 21 days when a secured party with a perfected
security interest makes the instruments, documents, or goods available to the debtor for cer-
tain, specified purposes. Id. § 9-304(5). In either event, however, the secured party must take
additional steps before the expiration of the 21 day period to continue the perfection of the
security interest. Id. § 9-304(6).
A security interest in noncash proceeds not covered by a filed financing statement meeting
the requirements of U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) becomes unperfected 10 days after the debtor receives
the proceeds unless "the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of
the ten day period." Id. § 9-306(3)(c).
43. Perfected security interests in documents, instruments, ordinary goods, and posses-
[Vol. XXXVI
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name, identity, or corporate structure;" or the secured party may de-
cide to release to the debtor collateral in which a security interest has
been perfected by possession. 5
If the secured party meets the requirements for continuing the
perfection of a security interest before the original period of perfec-
tion expires, the security interest is deemed to be perfected continu-
ously. 46 Moreover, the secured party's priority over other interests in
the same collateral dates from the time of the original perfection. 47 If
continuation is not accomplished before the original perfection ceases
to be effective, however, questions may arise concerning the priority
of the security interest over other claims to the collateral that arose
prior to the lapse in perfection.
Several article 9 provisions specify the consequences of failure to
reperfect a security interest before the original act of perfection
ceases to be effective. Under section 9-403, a filed financing state-
ment lapses five years after the original filing, and the security inter-
est becomes unperfected unless a continuation statement is filed
within six months prior to the expiration of the five year period. A
security interest that becomes unperfected upon lapse "is deemed to
have been unperfected as against a person who became a purchaser
or lien creditor before lapse. '48 Although a security interest may have
been senior to the claim of another secured creditor49 or a lien credi-
sory interests in chattel paper become unperfected four months after the collateral is moved to
another jurisdiction unless the secured party perfects the security interest in the new jurisdic-
tion within the four month period. Id. § 9-103(1)(d), (4). Perfected security interests in ac-
counts, general intangibles, mobile goods, and nonpossessory interests in chattel paper become
unperfected four months after the debtor moves to another jurisdiction unless the secured
party perfects the security interest in the new jurisdiction within the four month period. Id. §
9-103(3) (e), (4). Analogous, albeit more complex, requirements govern the reperfection of secur-
ity interests in goods covered by a certificate of title when the goods are moved to another
jurisdiction. Id. § 9-103(2).
44. Where a debtor so changes its name, identity, or corporate structure that a filed state-
ment "becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in
collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the change, unless a new ap-
propriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time." Id. § 9-402(7).
45. A security interest that is perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the
collateral "may be otherwise perfected . . . before or after the period of possession by the se-
cured party." Id. 9-305.
46. U.C.C. § 9-303(2) reads in full:
(2) If a security interest is originally perfected in any way permitted under this Article
and is subsequently perfected in some other way under this Article, without an interme-
diate period when it was unperfected, the security interest shall be deemed to be per-
fected continuously for the purposes of this Article.
47. Id. § 9-201, -301(1)(b) (priority conflicts with lien creditors); id. § 9-312(5) (priority
conflicts with other secured creditors).
48. Id. § 9-403(2).
49. A "purchaser" is a person who takes by purchase. U.C.C. § 1-201(33). "A 'purchase'
1984]
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tor50 whose interest arose during the time the original filed financing
statement was effective, it becomes junior to the other interest if the
secured party fails to file a continuation statement within the re-
quired period. 5' Furthermore, even if the secured party files a financ-
ing statement after the original financing statement lapses, his inter-
est will be junior to the claims of the other parties whose interests
arose in the interim, between the lapse and the filing.2
Section 9-103 contains analogous rules. When collateral is subject
to a perfected security interest in one jurisdiction and the collateral
or the debtor moves to another jurisdiction, the secured party nor-
mally must reperfect the security interest in the new jurisdiction
within four months.53 If the secured party fails to reperfect within
the four month period, "the security interest becomes unperfected at
the end of that period and is thereafter deemed to have been un-
perfected as against a person who became a purchaser after re-
moval. '54 As in section 9-403(2), a security interest that may have
been senior to the interest of a purchaser of the collateral while it
was originally perfected is subordinated to the purchaser's interest if
the secured party fails to reperfect before the original act of perfec-
tion ceases to be effective in the new jurisdiction. Unlike section 9-
403(2), however, section 9-103 allows only a purchaser, and not a lien
creditor to take priority over the security interest.55
Other article 9 sections make it clear that the secured party must
continue the perfection of his security interest before its original
perfection expires, 56 but they do not specify the effect of a failure to
includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or reissue, gift or any
other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." Id. § 1-201(32).
50. A 'lien creditor' means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved
by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors from the
time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the peti-
tion or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.
Id. § 4-302(3).
51. Id. § 9-403, comment 3. See also In re Super Treads, 7 Bankr. 532 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1980); Eastern Indus. Prod. Credit. Ass'n v. Farmers State Bank, 31 Ohio App. 2d 252, 287
N.E.2d 824 (1972); Stearns Mfg. Co. v. National Bank & Trust Co., 86 York Legal Record 89
(Pa. C. 1972); Morse Electro Prod. Corp. v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 90 Wash. 2d 195, 579
P.2d 1341 (1978).
Professor Gilmore is critical of U.C.C. § 9-403(2), noting that the subordination of a secur-
ity interest upon lapse to a junior interest is inconsistent with the general trend of pre-article 9
secured transactions law. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 588-92.
52. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b), 9-312(5); see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 592-94.
53. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(d), (3).
54. Id. § 9-103(1)(d)(i). See also id. § 9-103(3)(e).
55. See Review Comm. for art. 9 of the U.C.C., Perm. Ed. Bd. for the U.C.C., Final Re-
port at 245 (1971).
56. U.C.C. § 9-304(6), -305, -306(3)(c).
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do so. For example, if a secured party has a perfected security inter-
est in collateral,"1 the security interest normally continues in identifi-
able proceeds received by the debtor upon disposition of the collat-
eral, 8 and the security interest in the proceeds is continuously
perfected."9 This continuous perfection expires ten days after the
debtor receives the proceeds unless the financing statement covering
the original collateral satisfies the requirements of section 9-
306(3)(a)60 or the proceeds are identifiable cash'proceeds.61, To extend
the perfection beyond ten days, the secured party must perfect his
security interest directly in the proceeds."2
Section 9-306 leaves unanswered the question of whether the
claim of a lien creditor or another secured party that arose while the
security interest was perfected takes priority if the security interest is
not reperfected within the ten day period. There are, of course, two
potential answers to this question. First, the secured party, whose in-
terest was senior to that of the competing claimant while the security
interest was perfected, becomes junior to the competing claimant
when the period of temporary perfection expires. Alternatively, the
security interest retains its priority, established while it was per-
fected, over the competing interest.
The first solution provides a result similar to the rule in section 9-
403(2) governing the priority of lapsed financing statements,3 and
would establish general uniformity in the article 9 rules dealing with
lapse of perfection." Moreover, if the competing claimant is another
secured party with a perfected security interest, the priority rules of
article 9 provide indirect support for this solution. Section 9-
57. Although the discussion in the text focuses on the continuation of a perfected security
interest in proceeds, the analysis and solutions suggested also are applicable to the continuation
of nonfiled perfected security interests governed by U.C.C. §§ 9-304(6) and 9-305.
58. Id. § 9-306(2).
59. Id. § 9-306(3).
60. Specifically, the filed financing statement must cover:
[The original collateral and the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may
be perfected by filing in the office or offices where the financing statement has been filed
and, if the proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral in the
financing statement indicates the types of property constituting the proceeds.
Id. § 9-306(3)(a).
61. Id. § 9-306(3)(b).
62. Id. § 9-306(3)(c).
63. Supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. Because U.C.C. § 9-403(2) deals with the
lapse of filed financing statements, it is not applicable to cases in which a security interest is
perfected by some means other than filing.
64. Adoption of this solution would not establish complete uniformity because U.C.C. § 9-
103(1)(b) and (3)(e) provide that only the conflicting interest of a purchaser, and not that of a
lien creditor, takes priority over a security interest whose perfection lapses after the collateral
or the debtor moves to another jurisdiction. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
312(5)(a) states that conflicting security interests in the same collat-
eral "rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection." The
section further provides that priority dates from the time of filing or
perfection "provided that there is no period thereafter when there is
neither filing nor perfection." By negative implication, when a se-
cured party allows his perfection to lapse or expire, priority dates
only from the time of any later reperfection. A conflicting security
interest perfected prior to the lapse or expiration of an earlier inter-
est would continue to date its perfection from the time of its original
filing or perfection and would take priority even if the earlier interest
were later reperfected.6 5
The second solution corresponds to the position taken by pre-arti-
cle 9 personal property security law. 6 It would lend support to the
article 9 policy of subordinating the interests of competing claimants
to that of a secured party who has previously perfected his security
interest."7 This policy is based on the notion that a claimant who
takes an interest in collateral with notice of a previously perfected
security interest, or without having checked to determine whether
such an interest exists, assumes the risk of subordination. Because a
system of perfection is intended to give notice to those who might
deal with a debtor's collateral, as well as encourage them to seek out
the information, adverse parties who obtain, or could have obtained,
notice should be bound by it. While the failure to continue the
perfection of a security interest before it expires may result in denial
of priority for that interest over a claim that arises after lapse, it does
not diminish the notice given to others before the period of perfec-
tion lapsed."8
The holdings of the few courts that have faced this issue are di-
vided,69 and provide no clear judicial rule concerning whether a se-
65. It is important to note, however, that there is no parallel rule governing priority con-
flicts between secured parties and lien creditors containing this same implication. Thus, the
language of article 9 does not fully support the first solution.
66. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 581-84, 589.
67. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(1)(b) (subordination of a lien creditor to a perfected security
interest); id. § 9-312(5) (earlier perfected security interest takes priority over later perfected
interest).
68. 1 G. GiLMORE, supra note 2, at 588-94.
69. Security Say. Bank v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (perfection
lapsed when secured party failed to perfect its interest in proceeds within 10 days after their
receipt by debtor, and lien creditor who levied during 10 day period took priority over secured
party); Barnett Bank v. Applegate, 379 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978) (perfection of secur-
ity interest lapsed upon failure of secured party to perfect its interest in proceeds within 10
days of their receipt by debtor, and previously junior security interest in collateral became
senior to secured party); Blair Milling & Elevator Co. v. Wehrkamp, 217 Kan. 122, 535 P.2d 457
(1975) (secured party who failed to perfect its security interest in proceeds within 10 days after
their receipt by debtor took priority over lien creditor who levied on proceeds during 10 day
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curity interest is subordinated to previously junior claimants when
the perfection of the security interest lapses and the interest is not
reperfected within the ten day period. This lack of certainty in both
article 9 and case law may raise troublesome problems for secured
parties whose debtors become bankrupts.
III. DELAYED AND CONTINUED PERFECTION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978
As in article 9, a number of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978 permit delayed perfection of personal property se-
curity interests. Moreover, it may be particularly important for a se-
cured party to continue the perfection of his security interest, even
after the debtor goes bankrupt. The remainder of this article evalu-
ates the sections of the Bankruptcy Reform Act that deal with
delayed and continued perfection of security interests, and analyzes
their relationship with article 9.
A. Sections 544 and 546(b)
Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act provides, in part:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the
case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of
any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred
by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends to the debtor at the time of
the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such
time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all
property on which a creditor on a simple contract could
have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a
creditor exists.
Like its predecessor, section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,0
section 544(a)(1) arms the trustee with extensive powers. The trustee
has the rights of one who extends credit, and obtains a judicial lien
on all property on which such a creditor could have obtained a judi-
cial lien, as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case.7 1 The trus-
period; decided under 1962 version of article 9).
70. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 879, repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549.
71. "A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under
such chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Sections 302 and 303 specify the time of the commence-
ment of the case when joint or involuntary petitions are filed.
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tee need not subrogate to an actual creditor; his powers under this
section arise "whether or not such a creditor exists." Any information
that the trustee or an actual creditor may have about transfers of the
debtor's property is irrelevant because the trustee's rights under sec-
tion 544(a)(1) exist "without regard to any knowledge of the trustee
or of any creditor. '7 2
Although the Bankruptcy Reform Act empowers the trustee with
the rights of a creditor holding a judicial lien, it does not specify the
substantive content of those rights. Instead the trustee's rights under
section 544(a)(1) are determined by the substantive law of the juris-
diction governing the property in question,7 3 typically state law. Con-
sequently, when a conflict arises under section 544(a)(1) between the
trustee and a creditor with a security interest in personal property,7 4
the trustee's power to avoid the security interest is governed by arti-
cle 9.
Under section 9-301(1)(b), an unperfected security interest is gen-
erally subordinated to the rights of a party who becomes a lien credi-
tor before the interest is perfected. A lien creditor is defined in sec-
tion 9-301(3) to include both a creditor who acquires a lien on
property by attachment, levy or the like, and a trustee in bankruptcy.
Because the trustee obtains the rights of a judicial lien creditor at the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, a security interest that is un-
perfected at that time is subordinate to the rights of the trustee and
can be avoided by the trustee."
Although the trustee's avoidance powers as a hypothetical lien
creditor under section 544(a)(1) enable him to avoid most security
interests that are unperfected as of the commencement of the case,
his powers are limited by section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act: "(b) The rights and powers of a trustee under section 544, 545,
and 549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that
permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against
an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of
72. For a general discussion of the differences between § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act and § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY § 544.02
(15th ed. 1979); Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKS. L.J.
173, 174-76 (1979).
73. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 72, § 544.02, at 544-8 to-10.
74. Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act states that the trustee may avoid any
"transfer" of property. "'Transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity
of redemption." 11 U.S.C. § 101(46) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 368.
75. E.g., In re Turley, 17 Bankr. 99 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981).
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such perfection.""6
For a secured party to take advantage of the protection from
avoidance offered by section 546(b), the generally applicable law
must grant him priority over the holder of a judicial lien whose inter-
est in the collateral arose before the secured party perfected his se-
curity interest. The only section of article 9 that so provides is sec-
tion 9-301(2):7" a purchase money secured party who files a financing
statement before or within ten days after the debtor receives posses-
sion of secured collateral takes priority over a lien creditor whose
rights arise between the time the security interest attaches and the
time of filing. Consequently, a purchase money secured party whose
ten day grace period for filing has not expired as of the commence-
ment of the case may still obtain protection from avoidance. Section
546(b), in effect, incorporates the delayed perfection rule of section 9-
301(2) into the Bankruptcy Reform Act.7 18 Because there are no arti-
cle 9 grace periods for nonpurchase money security interests, the
holder of such an interest who has not perfected it as of the com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case cannot take advantage of the pro-
tection from avoidance afforded by section 546(b).
When it enacted section 546(b), Congress did not make an inde-
pendent policy decision concerning the necessity of permitting se-
cured parties to delay perfection of their security interests. Instead,
the section was designed to protect parties who might rely on delayed
filing provisions under state law from the surprise intervention of a
bankruptcy petition."' At least with regard to security interests in
personal property, Congress merely deferred to the determination
made by the drafters of article 9.80
76. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,98
Stat. 333, 377. Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act establishes and defines the trustee's
power to avoid the fixing of statutory liens on the debtor's property. 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1982), as
amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 377. Section 549 permits the
trustee to avoid certain postpetition transfers of property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1982),
as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 379.
77. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. U.C.C. § 9-312(4) is of no utility to the
secured party under § 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Under § 9-312(4), a secured party
who perfects his security interest after another party asserts a claim to the collateral gains
priority only over an earlier perfected security interest, and not over the rights of an interven-
ing lien creditor. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
78. When it enacted § 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress was aware of the
specific protection against the trustee's avoidance powers that U.C.C. § 9-301(2) would give to a
purchase money secured party. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1977).
79. Id. Section 546(b) is the statutory successor to § 67c(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ 3, 4, 80 Stat. 168, repealed by Act of Nov. 6,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549. Unlike § 67c(1)(B), however, § 546(b) autho-
rizes delayed perfection of consensual transfers as well as of statutory liens. 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRuPTcY, supra note 72, § 546.03, at 546-47.
80. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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In order for a purchase money secured party to obtain protection
under section 546(b), he must actually file a financing statement
within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the secured
collateral, even if the bankruptcy case has already commenced.8' In
most cases, the filing of the bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of
any act to "create, perfect, or enforce" any lien against property of
the bankruptcy estate,82 or against property of the debtor to the ex-
tent that the lien secures a claim that arose before the commence-
ment of the case.8 3 The bankruptcy filing, however, does not auto-
matically stay acts taken to perfect an interest in property when the
trustee's rights and powers are limited by section 546(b).a Thus, a
purchase money secured party whose ten day grace period for perfec-
tion has not expired at the commencement of a bankruptcy case can
take advantage of the delayed filing provision of section 9-301(2)
without fear of violating the Bankruptcy Reform Act's automatic
stay.8 5
Because a perfected security interest in personal property takes
priority over the rights of a lien creditor whose claim to the collateral
arises after perfection,8" the trustee, as a hypothetical lien creditor
under section 544(a)(1), cannot avoid a security interest that is per-
fected before the commencement of the case.87 If the perfection of a
security interest would otherwise lapse during the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, however, it is less clear whether the secured party must
continue the perfection in order to retain priority over the trustee
and, if so, how continuation of perfection is to be accomplished.
When a filed financing statement lapses before continuation, the
security interest becomes unperfected and is deemed to have been
unperfected against a person who became a lien creditor or a pur-
chaser before the lapse.' The previously senior secured party be-
comes, upon lapse, junior to intervening claimants. 9 A similar "re-
versal of priority" rule also may apply when a security interest is
perfected by a means other than filing, and the period of perfection
81. Cf. In re Fiorillo & Co., 19 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (mechanic's lien filed
after commencement of the case but within 4 month grace period established by state mechan-
ics' lien law).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982).
83. Id. § 362(a)(5).
84. Id. § 362(b)(3), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333,
371.
85. Cf. In re Fiorillo & Co., 19 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
86. U.C.C. § 9-201, 9-301(1)(b).
87. E.g., In re E.G. Hoover Co., 16 Bankr. 435 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982).
88. U.C.C. § 9-403(2); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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expires before perfection is continued.9" In either case, if the perfec-
tion expires during bankruptcy proceedings and is not continued, the
secured party may become junior to the trustee or others who assert
an interest in the secured collateral.9 "
A potential, although partial, solution to this problem appears in
section 9-403(2). Under that section, if a security interest has been
perfected by filing when the insolvency proceedings are commenced,
it will remain perfected until the end of sixty days after the termina-
tion of the proceedings.9 The section eliminates the need to file a
continuation statement during bankruptcy proceedings by providing
that a financing statement does not lapse during the proceedings.
Thus, the secured party would maintain the priority established by
his financing statement over claimants whose interests might other-
wise become senior to the security interest upon lapse. Although the
section establishes a rule applicable only in insolvency, it governs
conflicts between a secured party whose interest is perfected by filing
and all other types of claimants to the secured collateral. Conse-
quently, the provision also would appear to permit a secured party to
retain priority over the trustee if the trustee's interest in the collat-
eral was subordinate to that of a security interest perfected by filing
as of the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. Because section
9-403(2) deals only with security interests perfected by filing, it pro-
vides no protection in cases in which a security interest is perfected
other than by filing and the perfection expires after the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy case.9 s
Section 546(b) of the Reform Act appears to be of little help to a
secured party who seeks to continue the perfection of his security
90. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
91. The need to continue the perfection of a security interest after the commencement of
the case might arise in a number of situations. For example, if a security interest in property
acquired by a debtor before bankruptcy covers proceeds of that property, the interest in the
proceeds is generally effective against the trustee even though the estate may acquire proceeds
after the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10,
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 380. A security interest in noncash proceeds not covered
by a filed financing statement meeting the requirements of U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) becomes un-
perfected 10 days after receipt of the proceeds, however, unless "the security interest in the
proceeds is perfected before the expiration of the ten day period." Id. § 9-306(3)(c). Thus, a
secured party with an interest in proceeds acquired by the estate after the commencement of
the case might find it necessary to perfect his security interest in the proceeds before the ten
day period of automatic perfection expires. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
92. Section 9-403(2) provides: "If a security interest perfected by filing exists at the time
insolvency proceedings are commenced by or against the debtor, the security interest remains
perfected until termination of the insolvency proceedings and thereafter for a period of sixty
days."
93. See Review Comm. for Art. 9 of the U.C.C., Perm. Ed. Bd. for the U.C.C., Final Re-
port at 245 (1971).
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interest after the commencement of the case, especially if the secur-
ity interest has been perfected by a means other than filing. As previ-
ously noted, section 546(b) subjects the trustee's avoidance powers
under section 544(a)(1) to any generally applicable law that permits
perfection to be effective against one who acquires rights in the se-
cured property before the date of perfection."4 The trustee's avoiding
powers arise as of the commencement of the case. Thus, if a security
interest is perfected at that time, the trustee does not acquire his
rights "before" the date of perfection. Although section 546(b) "in-
corporates" into the Bankruptcy Reform Act the delayed filing provi-
sions of article 9, it does not incorporate the statute's continuation of
perfection sections.9 5 Consequently, section 546(b) does not protect a
secured party who must continue the perfection of his security inter-
est from the avoiding powers of the trustee."6
Moreover, if a secured party must continue the perfection of his
security interest after the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings,
and attempts to do so, he will most likely violate the automatic
stay.97 Section 362(b)(3) of the Reform Act does provide relief from
the automatic stay for an act to perfect an interest in property "to
the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b)." Because acts to continue the
perfection of a security interest do not appear to fall within the scope
of section 546(b), however, the relief from the automatic stay pro-
vided by section 362(b)(3) is unavailable.98 Thus, the secured party
must either risk violating the stay in order to continue the perfection
of his security interest,99 or request the bankruptcy court to lift the
94. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
96. If applicable state law requires seizure of property or commencement of an action to
accomplish perfection of an interest in the property against an entity that acquires rights
before perfection, "and such property has not been seized or such action has not been com-
menced before the date of the filing of the petition," § 546(b) provides that "such interest in
such property shall be perfected by notice [to the trustee] within the time fixed by such law for
such seizure or commencement." 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 377. Article 9 does not require either seizure of property or
commencement of an action to perfect a security interest, and a secured party cannot take
advantage of this notice provision of § 546(b) to perfect, or continue the perfection of, his
security interest after the commencement of the case. Cf. In re Utah Agricorp, Inc., 12 Bankr.
573 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (filing of a reclamation suit against the trustee was "neither the
statutory nor functional equivalent of a filing within this state" and did not eliminate the need
to continue the perfection of a security interest in collateral brought into the state after the
security interest in it was perfected in another jurisdiction; decided under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), (5) (1982).
98. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
99. An individual injured by a willful violation of the automatic stay may recover actual
damages, costs, attorney's fees, and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h),
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stay so that continuation can be accomplished. 00
The most effective protection for the secured party whose perfec-
tion expires after the commencement of the case lies not in the statu-
tory language of the Bankruptcy Reform Act or article 9, but in case
law developed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Under these hold-
ings, the rights of the trustee and the secured party to property
transferred by the debtor prior to bankruptcy are fixed, or frozen, at
the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings.101 If a security interest is
perfected as of the commencement of the case, the trustee, whose
rights as a judicial lien creditor arise at that time, is junior to the
secured party. Should the perfection of the security interest thereaf-
ter cease to be effective, the secured party need not file a continua-
tion statement or otherwise seek to continue the perfection. Rather,
the secured party retains his priority established at the commence-
ment of the case, even if he does nothing after that time to continue
the perfection of his security interest.
Not all cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 held that
the relative priority of a secured party and the trustee is frozen at the
time bankruptcy proceedings begin. 02 Moreover, when perfection by
a means other than filing ceases to be effective during bankruptcy
proceedings, the secured party cannot be certain that he will retain
priority against parties other than the trustee who claim an interest
in the secured collateral.103 For these reasons as well as the absence
of clear statutory language in either the Reform Act or the Uniform
Commercial Code, it remains uncertain whether a secured party must
attempt to continue the perfection of his security interest after com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case. In light of this uncertainty, if the
Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 352. Cf. In re Miller, 22 Bankr. 479 (D.
Md. 1982) (repossession of automobile by secured party who was without notice that debtor
had filed a bankruptcy petition and subsequent refusal to return automobile to debtor violated
automatic stay; damages resulting from loss of use of automobile awarded to debtor pursuant to
court's power to punish civil contempt); In re Munsey Corp., 10 Bankr. 864 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1981) (secured party whose interest was unperfected as of the commencement of the case must
remove from filing system a financing statement filed in violation of the automatic stay after
the date of the petition).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
101. Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1940); In re South
County Motel Corp., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1254 (D.R.I. 1976). See also 1 G. GI.-
MORE, supra note 2, at 584-85. 
102. In re Utah Agricorp, Inc., 12 Bankr. 573 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). It should be noted
that the strength of this case as precedent is open to question because of the court's obvious
confusion of a "lien creditor" with a "purchaser" under the Uniform Commercial Code.
103. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Cf. Eastern Ind. Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Farmers State Bank, 31 Ohio App. 2d 252, 287 N.E.2d 824 (1972) (where trustee did not assert
an interest in secured collateral and secured party failed to file a continuation statement before
the filed financing statement lapsed during bankruptcy proceedings, previously junior secured
party obtained priority over first secured party).
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perfection of a security interest would otherwise expire after the
commencement of a bankruptcy case, the secured party should re-
quest the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay so that continu-
ation can be accomplished.as
B. Section 547(e)
Under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,1°5
the trustee may avoid, as preferential, any transfer 0 6 of an interest of
the debtor in property that is made:
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of
an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer
was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4)
made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or (B) between 90 days and one year before
the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor, at
the time of such transfer was an insider;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such credi-
tor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B)
the transfer had not been made; and (C) such creditor
received payment of such debt to the extent provided by
104. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333, 377-78. The preference provisions of § 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act are, in many
respects, quite different from those of § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, but the central
concept of a preference as a transfer of property of the debtor to a creditor for or on account of
an antecedent debt remains much the same. Bankruptcy Act, § 60, 30 Stat. at 562.
Some of the more significant changes effected by § 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act that
are not discussed in this article include: the reduction of the period in which preferential trans-
fers may occur from four months to 90 days prior to bankruptcy; the creation of a presumption
that the bankrupt was insolvent during the preference period; the elimination of the require-
ment that a trustee prove that the transferee had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
was insolvent when the transfer was made; and the creation of a statutory formula limiting a
secured party's ability to protect from the trustee's avoiding powers after-acquired property
that is subject to a perfected security interest. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A), (c)(5), (f) (1982), as
amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 377-78. These and other
changes have spawned a substantial literature. E.g., 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPMCY, supra note 72, §
547; J. WHimT & R. SUMMERS, supra note 27, at 999-1017; Clark, Preferences Under the Old
and New Bankruptcy Acts, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 154 (1979); Kaye, Preferences Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1980); Kromnan, The Treatment of Security Interests in
After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 110 (1975);
Note, Avoidance of Preferential Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 65 IOWA
L. REV. 209 (1979).
106. A transfer of the debtor's property includes the creation of a security interest in it.
11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333, 368.
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the provisions of this title.
If a debtor transfers property to a creditor because of a previous obli-
gation of the debtor, the trustee can avoid the transfer as a prefer-
ence, assuming he can demonstrate that the other elements of a pref-
erence exist. Section 547(e) 07 is crucial to the preference scheme of
the Reform Act because it defines the time at which a transfer, for
purposes of section 547, occurs and, thus, effectively controls the de-
termination of whether.a transfer was made for or on account of an
antecedent debt." 8
In general, a transfer for purposes of section 547 occurs when the
interest of the transferee in the transferred property is perfected. 09
Section 547 does not mandate the method of perfecting an interest in
property, but it does specify the effect that perfection must have.
Section 547(e)(1)(B), for example, provides that a transfer of per-
sonal property is perfected when "a creditor on a simple contract
cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the
transferee." Like section 544(a)(1),1lo section 547(e) permits state
substantive law to determine when a judicial lien creditor can acquire
an interest in the transferred property superior to that of the trans-
feree." Thus, when the challenged transfer is the creation of a secur-
ity interest in personal property, the relevant provision is section 9-
301(1)(b), which provides that an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the claim of one who becomes a lien creditor before
the security interest is perfected. Essentially, the tests of the Reform
Act and article 9 converge. Under section 547(e), a transfer is per-
fected, and thus occurs, at the time at which a lien creditor cannot
acquire rights superior to those of the transferee. Under section 9-
301(1)(b) a lien creditor can subordinate the transferee only when he
levies on the collateral before the transferee perfects his security
interest." 2
Although section 547(e) of the Reform Act generally allows state
law to define the circumstances in which a judicial lien creditor can
acquire rights in transferred property that are superior to those of a
transferee, the Reform Act also overrides article 9 and permits
107. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333, 377-78.
108. The Bankruptcy Reform Act contains no definition of the term "antecedent." Sec-
tion 547(b)(2) simply states that an antecedent debt must be "owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made."
109. E.g., id. § 547(e)(2)(B).
110. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
111. 4 COLLMR ON BANKRuPTcy, supra note 72, § 547.46, at 547-136.
112. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b), (2).
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delayed perfection in cases in which article 9 does not authorize it.
Under section 547(e)(2)(A)," 3 for example, if a security interest is
perfected at the time that the interest is created or within ten days
thereafter, the transfer of the property, for purposes of section 547, is
deemed to occur when the interest was created, not when it was per-
fected. This result occurs under the Reform Act even though the act
of perfection may have been undertaken after the creation of the se-
curity interest and, under state law, a lien creditor could have ac-
quired rights superior to those of the secured party before perfection.
To illustrate this point, assume that a secured party makes a loan
to a debtor on May 1 and the parties enter into an enforceable non-
purchase money security interest on that date. The secured party
files to perfect the security interest on May 8. For purposes of section
547, the transfer is deemed to have occurred on May 1, rather than
on the actual date of perfection, May 8. Because the loan was made
on May 1 and the debt arose at that time, the transfer was not made
for or on account of an antecedent debt and it cannot be avoided by
the trustee as a preference. If the same transaction had occurred
outside of bankruptcy, however, a lien creditor who levied on the
property between May 1 and May 8, would take priority over the
secured party. In contrast to section 547(e)(2)(A), section 9-301(2)
provides a ten day filing grace period only to purchase money secured
parties, not to secured creditors with nonpurchase money security in-
terests." 4 In preference cases, then, the Reform Act clearly allows
more secured parties to delay perfection than does article 9 in
nonbankruptcy cases.1 5
113. Section 547(e)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 377-78, states, in full:
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsec-
tion, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if
such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time; (B) at the time such
transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 10 days; or (C) immedi-
ately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is not perfected at
the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; or (ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect
between the transferor and the transferee.
114. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
115. The intersection of two statutory systems with differing perfection requirements may
result in circular priority problems. See 2 G. GiLMORE, supra note 2, at 1022-23. For example,
assume that a nonpurchase money secured party takes a security interest in collateral and
makes a loan to the debtor on May 1, but does not perfect his security interest until May 8. On
May 6, a lien creditor levies on the secured collateral and, on June 1, the debtor files a bank-
ruptcy petition. Under § 9-301(1)(b), the lien creditor is entitled to priority over the secured
party because he levied before the security interest was perfected. Assuming the other elements
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Section 547(e)(2)(A) also permits delayed perfection of security
interests by means other than filing in cases in which article 9 does
not. The section states that a transfer must be perfected, but does
not specify any particular method of perfection. Under section 9-305
a secured party may perfect a security interest by taking possession
of the collateral. Because a secured party takes priority over a lien
creditor if he takes possession of the collateral before the lien credi-
tor levies on it,"1 perfection by possession satisfies the section
547(e)(1)(B) test for perfection of a transfer.117 Consequently, under
section 547(e)(2)(A), if a secured party takes possession of the collat-
eral within ten days after making a loan and creating an enforceable
security interest, perfection is deemed to have occurred at the time of
the loan and creation of the security interest, and the trustee cannot
avoid the transfer as a preference. In nonbankruptcy cases, however,
article 9 establishes no grace periods for secured parties who perfect
a security interest by taking possession of the collateral."" As a re-
sult, a lien creditor who levies on the collateral before the secured
party takes, or attempts to take, possession is not subordinated to
the claim of the secured party.1 "
For a number of reasons, Congress chose to give broad effect in
preference cases to the delayed perfection of security interests. First,
delayed perfection was permitted by section 60a(7) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898,120 and the provisions of section 547(e)(2) simply
extend and clarify that policy.' Under section 60a(7), perfection
could be delayed up to twenty-one days, depending upon the length
of any grace period established by state law. If state law did not spec-
ify a grace period, section 60a(7) I.(B) provided that, where perfec-
of a preference are present, however, the trustee can avoid the Hen as a preference because it is
a transfer of the debtor's property made to a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt.
Finally, because the security interest was perfected within 10 days after the secured party made
a loan to the debtor, the transfer of the debtor's property represented by the security interest is
not a preference and the trustee cannot avoid it. Thus, the lien creditor is prior to the secured
party, the trustee can avoid the lien, and the secured party defeats the trustee. Fortunately,
such a circular priority problem cannot arise under the Reform Act. Section 551 of the Reform
Act provides that any transfer avoided by the trustee under § 547 "is preserved for the benefit
of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). The trustee takes over the rights of the lien creditor,
whose lien he has avoided, and can defeat the secured party's claim by asserting the lien credi-
tor's priority over the secured party. 4 COLLER ON BAKRUPTCY, supra note 72, § 551.01, at 551-
52.
116. U.C.C. § 9-201, 9-301(1)(b).
117. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 23.
119. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
120. Act of Mar. 18, 1950, ch. 70, § 1, 64 Stat 24, repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549.
121. See Clark, supra note 105, at 164-65.
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tion occurred "within twenty-one days after the transfer, the transfer
shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of the transfer."
Although pre-article 9 "transaction filing" statutes often contained
filing grace periods of varying lengths, 122 the drafters of article 9
adopted a "notice filing" system that, in their view, made grace peri-
ods unnecessary except in cases involving purchase money security
interests. 123 Because article 9 established no delayed filing grace peri-
ods for nonpurchase money security interests, it was unclear whether
nonpurchase money secured parties could take advantage of the
twenty-one day period of section 60a(7) I.(B). It also was unclear
whether a purchase money secured party could delay perfection for
twenty-one days or was limited to the ten day period specified in ar-
ticle 9.124 Commentators generally agreed that both purchase money
and nonpurchase money secured parties should be able to delay
perfection for twenty-one days under section 60a(7) I.(B). 125 Congress
put the issue to rest by matching the grace period in section
547(e)(2)(A) with the ten day grace period given to purchase money
secured parties under article 9.126
Congress did not defer to the judgment of the drafters of article 9,
however, and limit the protection of the delayed filing provision of
section 547(e)(2)(A) to secured parties holding purchase money se-
curity interests. There appear to be two reasons for this decision. As
a practical matter, there may often be a delay between the creation
of a security interest and its perfection.2 7 Congress apparently recog-
nized this fact and made a policy decision that all secured parties
should have ten days in which to accomplish perfection without being
subjected to the risk that delay will result in a transfer being avoided
as preferential. More importantly, section 547 applies to preferential
transfers of realty, as well as personalty. 2 " Thus, the delayed perfec-
tion rules of section 547(e) must take into account the differences
between the perfection of interests in realty and the perfection of
security interests in personal property.'29 Interests in real property
normally cannot be perfected before the transaction creating the in-
terest is completed because real property recording statutes require
122. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
124. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 1325-35.
125. See Clark, supra note 105, at 158-59.
126. U.C.C. § 9-301(2); Clark, supra note 105, at 164.
127. See Clark, supra note 105, at 158.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1.982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333, 377-78, provides that "the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property."
129. E.g., id. § 547(e)(1)(A); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 72, § 547.48.
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that the deed or mortgage, or a copy thereof, be recorded. 130 If a
mortgage on real property cannot be perfected by recording until af-
ter the loan is made and the transaction is completed, the transfer, of
necessity, would be made for or on account of an antecedent debt.
The grace period of section 547(e)(2)(A) protects a real estate mort-
gagee from the risk that his mortgage will be avoided as a preference
if the mortgagee records the mortgage within ten days after making
the loan.
Section 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) of the Reform Act appears to extend the
ten day grace period for delayed perfection of security interests to
situations in which a bankruptcy case commences before the ten day
period expires." 1 Assume, for example, that a secured party makes a
loan to a debtor on May 1 and that the parties create an enforceable
security interest in the debtor's property on that date. On May 6 the
debtor files a bankruptcy petiton and, on May 8, the secured party
files to perfect its security interest. Section 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) implies
that a transfer perfected within ten days after it takes effect is not
deemed to have been made at the commencement of the case; thus, it
must be deemed to have been made at the time the transfer takes
effect. Consequently, in the example above, the transfer of the secur-
ity interest in the debtor's property would not have been made for or
on account of an antecedent debt and could not be avoided as a
preference.
Under the provisions of the Reform Act, as originally enacted, an
attempt to perfect a security interest pursuant to section
547(e)(2)(C)(ii) after the commencement of a case violated the auto-
matic stay.13 2 The original version of section 362(b)(3) of the Reform
Act rendered the stay inoperative only when the trustee's rights were
subject to delayed perfection under section 546(b).133 Under section
546(b), however, the trustee's rights and powers under "sections 544,
545, and 549" are subject to delayed perfection under generally appli-
cable law. Because section 546(b) does not apply to delayed perfec-
130. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (Supp. 1983).
131. 4 COLLAR ON BANKRuprcy, supra note 72, § 547.45, at 547-135.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), (5) (1982). Not all commentators agreed with this position.
The author of COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY stated:
If the ten-day period for perfection has not yet expired when the petition is filed, it can
still be utilized to relate back to the actual time of transfer. In other words, if the peti-
tion is filed a week after a transfer was made, three days are still left to perfect it and
the automatic stay should not apply to depart from the intent of the statute in this
regard.
The author cited no authority for this proposition, however. 4 COLLIR ON BANKRuPTcy, supra
note 72, § 547.45, at 547-135.
133. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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tion under section 547,134 the automatic stay prevented a secured
party from relying on section 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) to perfect his security
interest after bankruptcy began. The secured party, of course, could
request that the bankruptcy court lift the automatic stay so that he
could perfect his security interest after the commencement of the
case. 13 5 If the date of perfection was to relate back to the time of
transfer under section 547(e)(2)(C)(ii), however, the secured party
would be required to act quickly enough to have the stay lifted and
perfect his interest before the ten day grace period for delayed
perfection expired.
Congress has amended section 362(b)(3) to eliminate the possibil-
ity that a secured party -who perfects his security interest under sec-
tion 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) after the commencement of a case will violate
the automatic stay. Section 362(b)(3) now provides that the filing of a
bankruptcy petition does not operate as a stay of "any act to perfect
an interest in property .. . to the extent that such act is accom-
plished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this
title."'3 6 If a secured party is permitted to perfect a security interest
within the ten day grace period of section 547(e)(2)(A) without vio-
lating the automatic stay, even though a bankruptcy petition has
been filed, the transfer of the security interest will be deemed to have
occurred when it was made, and not at the time of perfection. In
cases in which the debt arose at the time of the original transfer, the
transfer would not be made for or on account of an antecedent debt
and the trustee could not avoid it as a preference.
This amendment to section 362(b)(3) does not resolve all of the
problems associated with the perfection of security interests after the
commencement of the case under section 547(e)(2)(C)(ii). If a non-
purchase money secured party perfects his security interest after the
commencement of the case under section 547(e)(2)(C)(ii),the trustee
can, in every case, avoid the security interest under section
544(a)(1). 13 7 Section 544(a)(1) arms the trustee with the rights of a
lien creditor as of the commencement of a bankruptcy case, and en-
ables him to avoid a security interest in personal property that is
unperfected on that date.'38 When generally applicable state law per-
mits perfection of a security interest to be effective against one who
acquires rights in the property before perfection, the trustee cannot
134. In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. 632 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
135. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333, 371.
137. See Kaye, supra note 105, at 218; cf. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 72, §
547.51, at 547-160.1.
138. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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avoid a security interest that is unperfected at the time of bank-
ruptcy, provided the secured party perfects his interest within the
applicable grace period. 139 Section 9-301(2) of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code establishes a grace period for the delayed perfection of
purchase money security interests,4 0 but no such period exists for
nonpurchase money interests. Thus, the broad authorization in sec-
tion 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) for delayed perfection after the commencement
of the case is essentially meaningless to the nonpurchase money se-
cured party whose interest will always fall to the trustee under sec-
tion 544(a)(1).
If the purpose of section 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) of the Reform Act is to
shield both purchase money and nonpurchase money security inter-
ests from attack as preferences by permitting perfection after com-
mencement of the case, Congress has been unsuccessful in accom-
plishing its objective. Although Congress has amended the Reform
Act to make it clear that the automatic stay does not bar the perfec-
tion of a security interest after the commencement of the case, where
perfection is undertaken pursuant to section 546(e)(2)(C)(ii), a non-
purchase money security interest always can be avoided under sec-
tion 544(a)(1). Congress might remedy this problem by extending to
nonpurchase money security interests the protection given to
purchase money interests under section 546(b). The reason for au-
thorizing delayed perfection in section 546(b) is to incorporate into
the Reform Act state law policies dealing with delayed perfection,
however, and an amendment giving protection to nonpurchase money
security interests would establish a federal rule inconsistent with the
policies of article 9. Thus, the best solution to this problem may be to
eliminate delayed perfection after commencement of the case under
139. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333, 377. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
140. A purchase'money security interest is protected from the trustee's avoiding powers
under § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982), as amended by
Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 377, when it is perfected after the com-
mencement of the case, but within the ten day grace period for delayed filing established by
U.C.C. § 9-301(2). See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. It also normally would be
protected from the trustee's power to avoid preferences, even if the secured party could not
perfect the security interest after the commencement of the case under § 547(e)(2)(C)(ii). 11
U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) (1982). Section 547(c)(3) of the Reform Act provides that the trustee
may not avoid, as a preference, a purchase money security interest that is perfected before 10
days after the debtor takes possession of the secured collateral. Because § 362(b)(3) makes the
automatic stay inoperative in cases in which delayed perfection is effective against the trustee
under § 546(b), the purchase money secured party is permitted to perfect his security interest
after the commencement of the case. If he does so, the delayed perfection should be effective
against the trustee for purposes of § 47(c)(3), as well as § 544(a)(1). Id. § 362(b)(3), 544 (a)(1),
546(b), 547(c)(3), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. Section
547(c) of the Reform Act is discussed more fully at infra notes 141-67 and accompanying text.
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section 547, unless applicable nonbankruptcy law establishes a grace
period for perfection of the transfer challenged by the trustee.
C. Sections 547(c)(1) and (c)(3)
Section 547(c)14 ' of the Bankruptcy Reform Act lists types of
transfers that cannot be avoided as preferences, even if all of the ele-
ments of a preference were present when the transfer occurred. Two
of these types of transfers may involve delayed perfection under arti-
cle 9:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for
whose benefit such transfer was made to be a con-
temporaneous exchange for new value given to the
debtor; and (B) in fact a substantially contempora-
neous exchange; ...
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired
by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new
value that was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agree-
ment that contains a description of such property
as collateral; (ii) given by or on behalf of the se-
cured party under such agreement; (iii) given to
enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such
property; and
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the
debtor receives possession of such property.
The language of section 547(c)(3) differs somewhat from the defi-
nition of a purchase money security interest in section 9-107 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 42 but both sections apply only to a se-
curity interest taken by a creditor who makes a loan or extends
141. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333, 355 and 377-78. For the most part, the exceptions to the trustee's power to avoid
preferential transfers that appear in § 547(c) had no statutory counterparts in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. Many are codifications of prior judicial decisions, however. 4 COLLIER ON BANK-
RupTcy, supra note 72, § 547.03, at 547-19 to -23.
142. U.C.C. § 9-107 states:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value
to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact
so used.
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credit143 that enables the debtor to acquire the secured collateral.
Both sections also require that the loan or credit must have been
used by the debtor to obtain the collateral."" In addition, the "ena-
bling loan"' 45 provision of section 547(c)(3) parallels generally the el-
ements of section 9-301(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
protects purchase money secured parties against intervening claims
by lien creditors.146 Despite these general similarities, there are dif-
ferences between section 547(c)(3) and section 9-301(2). Section
547(c)(3) specifies that new value must be given to the debtor "at or
after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description
of such property as collateral." Neither section 9-107 nor section 9-
301(2) expressly requires that a purchase money security interest be
accompanied by a written security agreement, but such a require-
ment is implicit in section 9-301(2). That section establishes a ten
day grace period, beginning when the debtor receives possession of
secured collateral, during which a purchase money secured party may
file a financing statement and obtain priority over a lien creditor who
levies on the collateral between the time the security interest at-
taches and the time of filing. 47 If a debtor is in possession of secured
collateral, however, article 9, like section 547(c)(3) of the Reform
Act, 48 requires the parties to the secured transaction to enter into a
143. Section 547(c)(3) of the Reform Act states that the creditor must have given "new
value" to the debtor. "New value" is:
[M]oney or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of
property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void
nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds of
such property, but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation.
11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333, 377-78. This definition is essentially the same as the requirement in U.C.C. § 9-107 that a
purchase money secured party must sell the collateral wholly or partially on credit, or must
make an advance or incur an obligation so that the debtor can obtain the collateral.
144. The secured party may be required to trace the proceeds of a loan in order to
demonstrate that it was in fact used by the debtor to obtain the secured collateral. 4 CoLLR
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 72, § 547.39, at 547-122; Kaye, supra note 105, at 205.
145. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1977).
146. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
148. Section 547(c)(3)(B) of the Reform Act states that a security interest must be "per-
fected" within ten days after it attaches, but does not specify a particular method of perfection.
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (1982), as amended by Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333, 377-78. Theoretically, a secured party could perfect a purchase money security inter-
est by taking possession of the collateral and, if he did so within 10 days after the security
interest attached, the interest might qualify for protection against avoidance under § 547(c)(3).
Because § 9-301(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code applies only to purchase money security
interests that are perfected by filing, under this interpretation § 547(c)(3) would cover a greater
number of secured transactions than does § 9-301(2). It is doubtful that § 547(c)(3) protects
security interests that are perfected by possession, however. The section also requires that new
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written security agreement containing a description of the
collateral. 14
9
In addition, the ten day grace period 150 of section 547(c)(3) may
be used to protect a purchase money security interest from avoidance
as a preference when the delayed perfection period of section
547(e)(2)(A) is not available. Under section 547(e)(2)(A), when a se-
curity interest is perfected within ten days after it takes effect, the
transfer of the debtor's -property is deemed to have occurred at the
time that the transfer took effect, and not at the time of perfec-
tion.' 5' Although a security interest takes effect when it attaches and
becomes enforceable,' 2 a secured party, including a purchase money
secured party, may make a loan or extend credit to the debtor before
the security interest becomes enforceable. In such cases, the delayed
perfection period of section 547(e)(2)(A) will not protect the security
interest from avoidance as a preference. That section relates the time
of transfer back only to the time that the security interest became
enforceable, and not to the time of the loan or the extension of
credit. Consequently, the transfer would still be treated as having
been made for or on account of an antecedent debt, even though
perfection of the security interest may have occurred within ten days
after its attachment. Under section 547(c)(3), however, the trustee
may not avoid a purchase money security interest that is perfected
within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the secured
collateral, no matter when the enabling loan was made. Thus, a
purchase money secured party who advances funds to the debtor
before a security interest becomes enforceable is protected from the
value be given to, and used by, the debtor to "acquire" the secured property. If the secured
party possesses the secured collateral, the debtor has not acquired it (property in the possession
of the secured party normally is not of great utility to the debtor) and § 547(c)(3) should not be
applicable to the transaction.
149. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a).
150. Both § 547(c)(3) of the Reform Act and § 9-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code
create ten day grace periods during which a secured party can delay perfection of his security
interest. As originally enacted, the Reform Act required that the security interest be perfected
within ten days after it attached. 'In contrast, article 9 requires a financing statement to be filed
within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the secured collateral. The difference
could create a trap for the unwary secured creditor, because a security interest can attach
before the debtor receives possession of secured collateral. See supra notes 26-27 and accompa-
nying text. If the security interesL did attach before the debtor obtained possession, a secured
party who relied on article 9 and dated his filing grace period from the time of possession could
find that the delayed filing period of § 547(c)(3), as originally enacted, had expired. See Kaye,
supra note 105, at 105-06. Congress removed this potential pitfall for secured creditors by
amending § 547(c)(3)(B) to provide that the grace period runs from the time the debtor re-
ceives possession of secured collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1982), as amended by Act of July
10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 377-78.
151. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982).
152. U.C.C. § 9-203(2).
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trustee's claim that the transfer was preferential, so long as he per-
fects the security interest within ten days after the debtor obtains
possession of the collateral.153
Section 547(c)(1) of the Reform Act states that the trustee may
not avoid, as a preference, a transfer that was intended by the parties
to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value, if the transfer was
in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange. For purposes of
section 547, a transfer can occur when a security interest is per-
fected.' Because the Reform Act does not define the term "contem-
poraneous," it is arguable that section 547(c)(1) permits delayed
perfection of new value security interests that do not meet the re-
quirements of either section 547(e)(2) or section 547(c)(3), so long as
the parties intended the secured transaction to be a contemporane-
ous exchange and the delayed perfection was, in fact, substantially
contemporaneous with the creation of the security interest. 55
The legislative history indicates that Congress did not have
delayed perfection of security interests in mind when it enacted sec-
tion 547(c)(1). Rather, the section was designed to protect short term
"credit" transactions involving the use of checks from avoidance as
preferences.158 When goods are purchased with a check, the transac-
tion is technically a credit transaction 5 7 because there is a delay be-
tween the time of sale and payment of the check. The actual transfer
of the buyer's funds to the seller at the time of payment is thus a
transfer for or on account of the antecedent debt that arose at the
time of sale. Such a transfer could be avoided by the trustee under
section 547(b) if the other elements of a preference were present at
the time of payment of the check. Congress intended to insulate this
type of transaction from attack as a preference.5 8 Many commenta-
tors"15 quickly pointed out, however, that section 547(c)(1) also ap-
peared to codify prior bankruptcy decisions 80 holding that a slight
delay in the creation or perfection of a security interest was not pref-
erential if the parties, from the outset, intended1 61 the transaction to
153. J. WHrrE & R. SUMmERS, supra note 27, at 1006-07.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (1982).
155. See J. WHrrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 27, at 1006; Hagedorn, The Survival and
Enforcement of the Secured Claim Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANuj.
L.J. 1 (1980); Kaye, supra note 105, at 198-99.
156. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1977).
157. U.C.C. § 2-511.
158. See Levin, supra note 72, at 186.
159. See, e.g., 4 COLLIER ON BANKuprcY, supra note 72, § 547.37, at 547-118; Country-
man, Bankruptcy Preferences-Current Law and Proposed Changes, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 95, 105
(1978); Kaye, supra note 105, at 198-99.
160. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
161. Where the creditor and the debtor did not intend a loan to be secured at the time it
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be secured.
Predictably, a number of secured creditors who failed to perfect
their security interests within the ten day grace periods of sections
547(e)(2) and 547(c)(3) have sought protection against avoidance by
invoking section 547(c)(1). Almost as predictably, the responses of
the courts to the arguments of the secured parties have differed. A
number of courts have held that section 547(c)(1) does not apply to
credit transactions. 162 Thus, a secured party who makes an enabling
loan by giving new value to a debtor, but does not perfect his security
interest within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral, cannot take advantage of section 547(c)(1) to escape the
trustee's claim that the transfer that occurred at the time of perfec-
tion was a preference.' Although some support for this interpreta-
tion may be found in the legislative history, the language of section
547(c)(1) does not expressly prohibit its application to credit or se-
curity transactions. These courts, then, appear to have read section
547(c)(1) too restrictively.
Other courts have decided that a secured party may use section
547(c)(1) to obtain protection from the trustee's power to avoid pref-
erences.' If a secured party makes an enabling loan to a debtor, but
does not perfect his security interest within ten days after the debtor
obtains possession of the collateral, the security interest may never-
theless be protected if the parties intended the security transaction
to be contemporaneous with the extension of credit and the court
finds it was substantially contemporaneous. While the language of
section 547(c)(1) is broad enough to support these holdings, this in-
terpretation of the statute reduces the ten day grace period of section
547(c)(3) to a mere evidentiary presumption.' As a result, in any
case in which a purchase money secured party fails to perfect within
the grace period of section 547(c)(3), the trustee could be forced to
litigate whether the transfer was intended to be, and was, contempo-
was made, but later entered into a security transaction, the security interest in the debtor's
property was a preferential transfer. National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
162. See, e.g., Gower v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Davis), 22 Bankr. 644 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 1982); Valley Bank v. Vance (In re Vance), 22 Bankr. 26 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982); Knaver v.
Enlow (In re Enlow), 20 Bankr. 480 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); Exchange Bank of Polk County v.
Christian (In re Christian), 8 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
163. E.g., Waldschimdt v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Murray), 27 Bankr. 445 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1983).
164. E.g., Ray v. Security Mutual Finance Corp. (In re Arnett), 17 Bankr. 912 (E.D.
Tenn. 1982); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martella (In re Martella), 22 Bankr. 649
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); Jahn v. First Tennessee Bank of Chattanooga (In re Burnette), 14
Bankr. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
165. See Waldschimdt v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Murray), 27 Bankr. 445, 452
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983).
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raneous.166 There is no reason to believe that Congress intended to
create such a possibility when it enacted section 547(c)(1). To the
contrary, the ten day grace period in section 547(c)(3) suggests that
Congress expected a relatively simple resolution of questions regard-
ing the delayed perfection of purchase money security interests.
Because the words "substantially" and "contemporaneous" are
imprecise by nature and are not defined in the Reform Act, it ap-
pears that Congress used them in section 547(c)(1) to give courts
some flexibility in preference cases. Nevertheless, courts should re-
strict the applicability of section 547(c)(1) to cases that do not in-
volve mere delayed perfection of security interests. If the issue in a
preference case is one of delayed perfection, sections 547(c)(3) and
547(e)(2) should be applied exclusively to determine the validity of a
security interest. Section 547(c)(1) can then be applied when issues
other than delayed perfection arise, such as when a secured party and
a debtor delay the creation of a security interest for a limited time,6 7
or when a buyer pays for property with a check.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without question, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 brought
bankruptcy law closer to the legal concepts of article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. It is also clear, however, that the provisions
of the two statutes often differ substantially in cases in which
delayed or continued perfection of security interests is involved. In
adopting the Reform Act, Congress did not incorporate wholesale the
policy choices made by the drafters of article 9. Instead, the Reform
Act contains numerous examples of independent policy decisions
made by Congress. Thus, under section 547 of the Reform Act, all
secured parties, not just purchase money secured parties, have a
grace period in which to perfect their security interests and the grace
period of section 547 appears to be applicable to security interests
perfected by possession as well as by filing.
Some provisions of the Reform Act also contain flaws that should
be remedied by Congress or the courts. The uncertainty that sur-
rounds the secured party's right to continue the perfection of his se-
curity interest after commencement of bankruptcy proceedings
should be addressed by Congress. Section 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) should be
rewritten to make it clear that a secured party may perfect his secur-
ity interest after commencement of the case only in cases in which
166. See Weil v. Tennessee Central Credit Union (In re Kelley), 3 Bankr. 641 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1980).
167. See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
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state law expressly permits delayed perfection of a security interest.
Finally, the courts, and perhaps Congress, should limit the applica-
tion of section 547(c)(1) so that section cannot be employed to sanc-
tion delayed perfection of security interests in cases in which the Re-
form Act does not expressly authorize it.
